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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Third District Court decision
finding the statute providing for filing fees for candidates for
public office unconstitutional because it denied Equal Protection
of the Law and has the effect of making a property requirement to
be a candidate for public office.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judge Dean E. Conder, Third District Court, held §20-3-14
Utah Code Annotated to be unconstitutional under Article I,
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and ordered that the
appellants (William Hoyle and Bruce Bangeter) names be placed on
the ballot.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the Lower Court Judgment upheld.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The parties Stipulated to the qualification of William Hoyle
and Bruce Bangeter to be candidates for U. S. Congress from Utah
except for the payment of a filing fee.

The respondent Hoyle had

paid the filing fee into the Court pending the resolution of the
issues in this case.

Bruce Bangeter filed an Affidavit of Impe-
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cuniosity which was rejected by the appellent in as much as there
was no statutory provision to waive the filing fee based on
impecuniosity.
The parties furthermore stipultated that for the purposes of
this case, the respondents were impecunious in as much as there
were no standards by which to measure that status.
ARGUMENT
I

IN AS MUCH A UTAH LAW PROVIDES FOR NO PROCEDURE TO BE
NAMED AS A CANDIDATE ON A BALLOT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE WITHOUT PAYING
A FILING FEE, THERE IS A PROPERTY REQUIREMENT TO RUN FOR OFFICE
AS PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 4 AND ARTICLE IV, SECTION 7 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
THEREFORE, SECTION 20-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Article I, Section 4 and Article IV, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah each prohibit a property
requirement for voting or holding political office.
Article I, Section 4 states:
" •••• No property qualification shall be required of any
person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this
Constitution."

Respondent has found no exceptions (since Article
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IV, section 7 was amended, a point not acknowledged by appellants

brief,) in Utah's Constitution.

The Fourteenth Amendment provi-

des that no State shall pass any laws that denies

ff • • •

to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The challenged statute violates all of the cited constitutional prov is ions.

Sec ti on 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated states:

Any candidate filing a nomination paper or
acceptance as provided in this act shall pay
to the filing officer a fee for such filing.
The fee to be paid shall be one fourth of one
per cent of the total salary for the full
term legally or customarily paid by such
office to the person holding the same, but
such fee shall not be less than $5.00, except
filings for all precinct offices shall be
$1 .00. No filing fees shall in any event be
returned to the candidate.
Regardless of Point II of appellants brief, the Utah
Legislature has required that a candidate for the offices
recieving the least amount of compensation have at least property
in the value of one dollar.

If a person desires to run for the

United States Senate, he must have property in an amount close
to Eight Hundred Dollars ($800 .00).

This discrimination was one

issue presented to, but not decided, by the District Court.
Never-the-less, if the inability of a person to pay a filing fee
Prevents a person from being a candidate for office, there is a
Property requirement

ff

to hold off ice. ff
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In 1966 the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections 383 U. S. 663, 16 L,
ed 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966) declared it to be a denial of
Equal Protection of the law for the State of Virginia to charge a
poll tax before exercising the right to vote by its citizens.
The stated as follows:
We conclude that a State violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter
or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
Votes qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or
any other tax. id., 16 L. Ed 2d at p. 172

Furthermore, the amount, regardless how small is not accep·
table.
We say the same whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his
pocket or nothing at all, pays the fee or
fails to pay it. The prinicple that denies
the State the right to dilute a citizen's
vote on account of his economic status or
other such factors by analogy bars a system
which excludes those unable to pay a fee to
vote or who fail to pay. id., 16 L. Ed 2d at p. 173
That case set the standard which prohibited economic
requirements restricting access to the ballot.
In Kraner v. Union Free School District 395 U. S. 621,
Ed 2d 583, 89 S Ct. 1886 (1969).

231

The Court struck down a voter
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·

qualification which restricted voters in such elections to, among
other things, "Property owners or leasers of taxable real
property" in the School Board District.

The Court required the

State of New York to show a "Compelling State interest" why the
discrimination was necessary.

That same standard has not been

met by the State of Utah here.
The Court in the case of Builock v. Carter 405 U. S. 134,
31 L. Ed 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849, (1972) in striking down a Texas

law which exacted filing fees from candidates for public office,
which amounts were set by the Political parties, and included
some relationship to the expected emoluments of the office.

The

statute placed the financing burden of primary elections on the
political parties and, in most instances, the primary election
us determinative of the final election.
The Bullock Court was concerned with the burden on candidates rather than on the right to vote directly.

But upon

deciding that any restrictions on the access of a candidate to
the ballot, the voters rights were restricted in some degree.

Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most
candidates could be expected to fulfill form
their own resources or at least through
modest contribution,s the very size of the
fees imposed under the Texas system gives it
a patently exclusionary character. Many
potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent bakers are in every
practical sense precluded from seeking the
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nomination of thier chosen party, no matter
how qualified they might be, and no matter
how broad or enthusiastic their popular
support. The effect of this exclusionary
mechanism on voters is neither incidental nor
remote. Not only are voters substantially
limited in their choice of candidates, but
also there is the obvious likelihood that
this limitation would fall more heavily on
the less affluent segment of the community,
whose favorites may be unable to pay the
large costs required by the Texas system.
Id • 31 L. Ed 2 d At p. 10 0 •
The Court found that since the exhorbitant filing fees in
that state affected voters choices.

The standards of Harpuv.

Virginia Board of Elections, supra. and Kramer v. Union Free
School District, supra.
discrimimatory laws.

must be met by the state in upholding

That is,

Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a
real and apreciable impact on the exercise of
the franchise, and because this impact is
related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate. Bullock,
3 1 L . Ed 2 d at p • 1 0 0 •
Finally, in the case of Lubin v. Panish
L. Ed. 2d 702, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974).

415 U. S. 709, 3~

The Court struck down a

California law that had no provision for indigent candidates
having access to the ballot.

The Court specifically rejected

the rationale advanced by the State of Utah.

While recognizin!

that preventing "laundry list ballots" as being a legitimate
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State interest,

that reason did not meet the strict scrutiny

required to limit ballot access.

The Court stated:

This legitimate state interest, however, must
be
achieved by a means that does not
unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a
minority party's or an individual candidate's
equally important interest in the continued
vailability of political opportunity. The
~terests involved are not merely those of
parties or individual candidates; the voters
can assert their preferences only through
candidates or parties or both and it is this
broad interest that must be weighed in the
balance. The right of party or an individual
to a place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights of
voters. Id. 39 L. Ed 2d at p. 708.
Futhermore, the appellants agrument regarding control of the
ballot ws not pursuasive to the Lubin Court.

A large filing feem may serve the legitimate
function of keeping ballots manageable but,
standing alone, it is not a certain test of
whether the candidacy is serious or spurious.
A wealthy candidate with not the remotest
chance of election may secure a place on the
ballot by writing a check. Merchants and
other entrepreneurs have been known to run
for public office simply to make their names
known to the public. We have also noted that
prohibitive filing fees, such as those in
Bullock can effectively exclude serious candidates. Conversely, if the filing fee is
more moderate, as here, impecunious but
serious candidates may be prevented from
running. Id. at p. 709.
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Consequently, the rationale advanced by the appellant in our case ,
will not meet Federal Constitutional Standards.

Surely, Ut~

should be desirous of encouraging the broadening of the vot~o
0

oppotunities of its citizens rather than making them more
restrictive.
The State of Utah has advanced no original argument to show
that the deficiencies of 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated are excusab 1 e under the cited U. S. Supreme Court cases •

The agrument

that there is equality between write in candidates and those with
names printed on the ballot is specious and petty.
of equal time

The concepts

in the press, simple news coverage and the proble1

of name identificatio.n are all realities where a write-in candidate

would be at a disadvantage.

Most importantly,

the State of Utah has advanced no argument

upon which this Court could conclude that the exclusion of an
impecunious provision is based on a rational need.

In fact, they

have made no attempt whatever to rationalize the deficiency in
the Statute.

They, not the respondents, must show this Court

that the District Court errored in its "close Scrutiny of the
Law" or that it wrongfully concluded the omission was
"reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate
State objective".

They have not done so.

Nothing respondent advances here suggests a filing fee,
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where it is legitimatly based, and the

potential candidate can

so pay, is prohibited.
CONCLUSION
seciton 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated denies Equal Protection
of the Laws as required by the Fourteenth amendment to the United
States constitution and places a property requirement on holding
office as prohibited by Article I, Section 4 and Article IV,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

And there is no legitimate

state objective that is rationally based which is fulfilled by
the deficiency.
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I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief wu
hand delivered to Robert B. Hansen at the Attorney's General
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 8414, on
this _ _ __ day of April, 1979.
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